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The Rule of Lenity and Environmental Crime
Joshua D. Yountt
For the last twenty-five years, explosive growth in environmental law has marked the legal landscape. As Americans came
to recognize the dangers posed by a spoiled environment, Congress passed increasingly stringent environmental statutes.
Notably, the greater availability and use of criminal sanctions
has played a prominent role in the effort to protect the environment. Proponents of criminal enforcement hope the increased
deterrence associated with criminal sanctions will convince
polluters to treat environmental laws as more than just a cost of
doing business.1
In the last several years, however, civil libertarians and
strict constructionists have raised objections to the current
enforcement scheme.2 They question why such stringent criminal
environmental provisions should be exempt from the traditional
interpretive rules for criminal laws. Environmental laws have
enjoyed broad interpretation and weakened culpability requirements because of their status as public welfare statutes. However, the current scope and severity of such laws give many people
pause.8 Those troubled by the opportunity for injustice in lower
standards of liability and greater penalties for violations suggest
that the rule of lenity should apply to environmental crime. The
rule of lenity calls for courts to read ambiguous criminal statutes

t B.A. 1995 Illinois Wesleyan University, J.D. Candidate 1998 University of Chicago.
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, An Essay on Environmental Criminality, in Sally M,

Edwards, Terry D. Edwards, and Charles B. Fields, eds, Environmental Crime and'
Criminality: Theoretical and Practical Issues 3, 14-15 (Garland 1996) ("Criminality");
Kathleen Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environ.
mental and Criminal Law Theory 22 (Washington University School of Law Working;

Paper No 96-4-1, 1996) ("Crossroads");Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal
Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 Geo Wash L Rev 889, 893-95 (1991).
2 Charles Oliver, A Green War on Civil Liberties? Enviro-Laws Offer Fewer Defen.
dant Safeguards, Investor's Business Daily Al (Nov 24, 1995); Note, The Mercy of Scalia:
Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197 (1994); Lisa
Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule of Lenity in the Interpretationof Environmental
Crimes, 5 NYU Envir L J 600 (1996).

3 Oliver, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited in note 2); Kevin Gaynor, A System
Spinning Out of Control, Envir F 28 (May-June 1990); Paul Kamnenar, Environmental!
Protectionof Enforcement Overkill?, Envir F 29 (May-June 1990).
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narrowly, giving the benefit of any interpretive doubt to defendants.' The significant ambiguity in many environmental statutes only increases the importance of applying the rule of lenity.
This Comment defends applying the rule of lenity to environmental crime. It describes the essential characteristics of criminal environmental law, focusing on its harshness and breadth. It

then discusses the rule of lenity, its justifications, and its traditional exceptions. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
severity and scope of criminal environmental law demand application of the rule of lenity.
I. INCREASING CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

A. Legislative and Prosecutorial Efforts
The availability and scope of criminal sanctions for environmental law violations have increased significantly in recent
years. Almost all environmental statutes contained criminal
provisions when enacted, but enforcement was less than vigorous
and penalties were rather mild.5 In the 1980s and early 1990s
Congress significantly enhanced criminal provisions in the
nation's environmental laws.' It introduced new, more serious

Norman Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 at 102 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan 5th ed 1992) ("Sutherland").
' Thomas Kelley, Jr. and Nancy Voisin, Enforcement Trends, in ALI-ABA, Criminal
Enforcement of EnvironmentalLaws 21, 24 (ALI-ABA 1992) ("Trends"); Donald Carr, et al,
Environmental Criminal Liability:Avoiding and Defending Enforcement Actions 5 (BNA
1995) ("Liability").
6 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6928(d), (e) (1994), amended by
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub L No 98-616, 98 Stat 3221, 325657 (doubling maximum penalties for minor violations to $50,000 and 2 years imprisonment, increasing maximum fine and sentence for a knowing violation of substantive
requirement from $25,000 and 2 years to $50,000 and 5 years, and introducing knowing
endangerment provision carrying maximum penalties of $250,000 ($1 million for organizations) and 15 years imprisonment); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC § 9603(bX3), (dX2) (1994), amended by Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613, 1632-33
(increasing maximum penalties to 3 years imprisonment (5 years for second or subsequent
offense) and a fine in accordance with Title 18 up from 1 year and $10,000 or $20,000);
Clean Water Act, 33 USC § 1319(c) (1994), amended by Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub L
No 100-4, 101 Stat 7, 42-45 (replacing willful violation carrying maximum penalties of
$25,000 per day of violation and 1 year imprisonment with offense levels for negligent
violations with same maximum penalties, knowing violations with maximum penalties of
$50,000 and 3 years imprisonment and knowing endangerment with maximum penalties
of $250,000 and 15 years imprisonment, penalties for all to be doubled upon subsequent
offenses); Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7413(c) (1994), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, 2675-77 (increasing fines pursuant to Title 18
and imprisonment from 2 to 5 years for knowing violations and from 6 months to 2 years
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crimes and stiffened penalties across the board. 7 Now, most violations are felonies with accordingly significant fines and prison
sentences.' Congress also enacted a pair of laws that bestowed
greater resources and powers on the EPA to enforce environmental laws criminally.9 Furthermore, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, enacted in 1987, contain specific provisions for environmental crimes and make prison sentences considerably more
likely.1"
To make matters worse for potential defendants, the notorious ambiguity of environmental statutes1' leaves significant discretion to courts, prosecutors, and bureaucrats to resolve textual
uncertainty. Perhaps the most consistent ambiguity relates to the
scienter requirement for a "knowing violation." Does such a requirement demand that a perpetrator know she is violating an
environmental statute or merely that she know the nature of her
conduct?1" Other ambiguities pervade environmental law as,
well. Is a human being a "point source" under the Clean Water
Act?18 Do wetlands or temporary ponds qualify as "navigable
waters" for regulatory purposes? 4

for false statements and creating offenses for knowing endangerment with fines pursuant
to Title 18 ($1 million maximum for organizations) and maximum imprisonment of 15
years and negligent endangerment with a fine under Title 18 and maximum imprison..
ment of 1 year). See also Brickey, Crossroads at 6, 10 (cited in note 1); Carr, Liability at
19 (cited in note 5).
See note 6.
See note 6; Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution
of EnvironmentalLaw: Reforming Environmental CriminalLaw, 83 Georgetown L J 2407,
2447 (1995); Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 21, 27-29 (cited in note 5); Carr, Liability at 19
(cited in note 5).
' Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-582, 102 Stat 2950, 2958-59,
codified at 18 USC § 3063(a) (1994) (bestowing full police powers on EPA investigators);
Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub L No 101-593, 104 Stat 2962, 2962-63, codified at
42 USC § 4321 (1994) (raising the number of EPA investigators to 200 by October 1, 1995,
and creating a national environmental enforcement training center). See also Lazarus, 83
Georgetown L J at 2447-48 (cited in note 8); Helen Brunner, Environmental Criminal!
Enforcement: A Retrospective View, 22 Envir L 1315, 1325 (1993); Robert Deeb, Environmental CriminalLiability, 2 SC Envir L J 159, 163-64 (1993).
10 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2Q at 191 (Nov 1994);
Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 27-29 (cited in note 5); Carr, Liability at 13-14 (cited in note
5); Deeb, 2 SC Envir L J at 177-82 (cited in note 9). Guidelines for organizations are in
the process of being developed. Carr, Liability at 353-470 App B-H (cited in note 5).
" See text accompanying notes 89-93.
,2 See United States v Self, 2 F3d 1071 (10th Cir 1993); United States v Weitzenhoft,
35 F3d 1275 (9th Cir 1993); United States v Speach, 968 F2d 795 (9th Cir 1992); Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Criminal
Liability in Substance But Not Form, 37 Buff L Rev 307, 329-36 (1988).
13 See United States v Plaza Health Laboratories,Inc., 3 F3d 643 (2d Cir 1993).
" See Leslie Salt Co. v United States, 55 F3d 1388 (9th Cir 1995); United States v
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In addition, administrative agencies responsible for environ-

mental laws have stepped up enforcement."6 They have begun to
exercise both administrative and prosecutorial discretion. For
instance, the Justice Department's Environmental Crimes Section and the EPA's Criminal Enforcement Division have both

grown in size and importance since the mid-1980s. 6 Additionally, some local U.S. Attorney's Offices have begun to initiate
prosecutions and some have even formed their own environmen-

tal crime units. 17 In a similar fashion, the states have also devoted more attention to prosecuting environmental crimes, often
at the urging of or in partnership with the federal government."
Consequently, prosecutions have increased in both number"9
and diversity,' subjecting a wide array of individuals and corporations to criminal penalties.
B. Judicial Innovations
The courts, too, have done their part to enhance criminal
environmental law. The responsible corporate officer doctrine
allows the government to prosecute "responsible corporate
agents" for the strict liability crimes of the corporation.2 ' The
Mills, 817 F Supp 1546 (N D Fla 1993).
" Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 23-27 (cited in note 5); Carr, Liability at 5 (cited in
note 5). In 1993, the EPA referred 140 cases to the Justice Department, resulting in 76
successful prosecutions and 135 convictions, up from 65, 32, and 55, respectively, in 1990
and 20, 7, and 11, respectively, in 1982. Furthermore, in 1993, defendants were sentenced
to 892 months in prison, served 876 months and were sentenced to probation for 3,240
months up from 278, 185, and 1,284 months respectively in 1988. Finally, while not all
statistics are available for 1994 and 1995 there was an all-time high 256 referrals in 1995,
indicating that the trend continues. Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1995 533 (GPO 1996).
16 Judson Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA- The Origins of Environmental
Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 Geo Wash L Rev 900 (1991);
Brickey, Crossroadsat 7-9 (cited in note 1). EPA now has at least 200 criminal investigators pursuant to the Pollution Prosecution Act, 42 USC § 4321, up from 50 in 1990 and 23
in 1983. Starr, 59 Geo Wash L Rev at 901 n 2. The Justice Department's Environmental
Crimes Section currently employs 35 attorneys up from 28 in 1991 and 3 in 1982. Kelly
and Voisin, Trends at 24 (cited in note 5); Telephone Interview with Secretary to Chief of
Environmental Crimes Section (Nov 22, 1996).
" Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 25 (cited in note 5).
16 Id at 25. The federal government has established training programs and allowed
only states with adequate criminal provisions to have permitting authority under the
Clean Air Act. Carr, Liability at 10-12 (cited in note 5). Local prosecutions rose from 381
in 1990 to 882 in only the first six months of 1992, representing a 417 percent increase in
prosecutions. Department of Justice, Environmental Crime Prosecution: Results of a
National Survey 3-4 (1994).
19 Carr, Liability at 12-13 (cited in note 5).
20 Id at 14-16, 32-33, 113-14.
1 United States v Park, 421 US 658, 670-73 (1975); Ellen Podgor, White Collar Crime
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government can also prosecute a corporate officer for corporate
crimes if the officer both has direct responsibility in the corporate

scheme
for the illegal conduct and knew the conduct was occur.22
ring.
Judicial innovations also make convicting a corporation easi..

er. Courts will employ an aggregate intent or collective knowl.edge standard to assess corporate liability.2' Under such a stan-

dard, one person does not need to have the requisite mens rea
and perform the actus reus; instead, it is sufficient to show that
one employee had the mens rea while another performed the
actus reus.24 Traditional standards of respondeat superior also
reduce the difficulty of convicting a corporate entity by making EL
company liable for those actions of employees that are within the
scope of their duties and that benefit the company.'
Furthermore, courts typically classify environmental law
violations as public welfare offenses, warranting a reduced
knowledge standard.2 6 Contrary to traditional criminal law in-

terpretation, courts presume public welfare offenses carry strict
liability.27 Even when the legislature imposes a knowledge re-

quirement, courts often limit the scope and weaken the demands
of such a requirement.2" Most courts faced with the typical

"knowing violation" statutory language will not require proof that
the defendant knew he was violating the law.2' Furthermore,
in a Nutshell § 3.06 at 51-53 (West 1993) ("Nutshell"); Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 29-30
(cited in note 5); Oliver, Investor's Business Daily at Al (cited in note 2); Comment, Application of the Rule of Lenity: The Specter of the Midnight DumperReturns, 8 Tulane Envir
L J 265, 278-80 (1994).
' Podgor, Nutshell § 3.07 at 50 (cited in note 21); Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 29-30
(cited in note 5); Carr, Liability at 129-31 (cited in note 5). See also United States V
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F2d 35, 50-55 (1st Cir 1991).
United States v Bank of New England, NA, 821 F2d 844, 856 (1st Cir 1987);
Podgor, Nutshell § 3.03 at 45-46 (cited in note 21); Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 31 (cited
in note 5).
2

See note 23.

United States v Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F2d 1000, 1004-07 (9th Cir 1972); Podgor,
Nutshell § 3.02 at 37-45 (cited in note 21); Kelley and Voisin, Trends at 31 (cited in note
5).
, Self, 2 F3d at 1089; Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1283-86; United States v Hayes International Corp., 786 F2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir 1986); Carr, Liability at 134 n 166 (cited in
note 5); Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2473-76 (cited in note 8); Comment, 8 Tulane
Envir L J at 273-80 (cited in note 21); Comment, Statutory Interpretation of the Clean
Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A)s Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the Needs of Env~ironmentaland CriminalLaw, 23 Ecol L Q 447, 459-62 (1996).
27 Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 11.02[B] at 126-27 (Matthew
Bender/Irwin 2d ed 1995) ("Understanding");Carr, Liability at 129 (cited in note 5).
" United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F2d 662, 669 (3rd Cir 1984); Carr,
Liability at 132 (cited in note 5); Comment, 37 Buff L Rev at 329-35 (cited in note 12).
' The Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted the phrase "knowing violation" to
2

612

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1997:

prosecutors may prove knowledge circumstantially by reference
to the position, responsibilities, and actions of a defendant."
Courts also use the remedial purpose doctrine to interpret
environmental laws liberally."' Under this canon of interpretation, courts broadly construe statutes that seek to redress societal
problems so as to effectuate that purpose. 2 Thus, courts will
generally read statutory ambiguities in environmental laws in
favor of the government.
Finally, because environmental laws are administrative
laws,' courts give wide latitude to administrative agencies in
interpreting and implementing environmental statutes. 4 Criminal enforcement relies on these agency interpretations because
many provisions simply criminalize any violation of the statute
committed with the proper mental state or causing sufficient
damage. 5 The deference courts afford agencies expedites the
process of defining criminal environmental law standards and
preserves agency flexibility to address unanticipated prosecutorial needs.
Cumulatively, the legal doctrine and enforcement resources
associated with criminal environmental law provide the government with a set of legal tools considerably more severe and farreaching than those available in almost any other area of law. In
this legal context, is it appropriate to exempt environmental
crime from the traditional restraints on criminal law? Or are

mean merely that the defendant know the nature of his conduct rather than that he know
his conduct violated the law. United States v International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,
402 US 558, 563-65 (1971). See also note 26.
3' Johnson & Towers, 741 F2d at 669-70; Hayes International, 786 F2d at 1504;
Podgor, Nutshell § 3.05 at 50-51 (cited in note 21).
" Johnson & Towers, 741 F2d at 666. See also Blake Watson, Liberal Construction of
CERCLA underthe Remedial Purpose Canon:Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing
Too Far?, 20 Harv Envir L Rev 199, 201-2 (1996).
32 William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, Cases and Materialson Legislation:Statutes
and the Creation of Public Policy 652-53 (West 2d ed 1995) ("Legislation").
Because Congress has charged the EPA and other environmental with implementation of environmental statutes, those laws are considered administrative. Alfred Aman
and William Mayton, Administrative Law 1 (West 1992). An administrative agency
typically promulgates and enforces regulations pursuant to a statutory directive. EPA involvement in criminal enforcement of environmental laws is limited to investigation and
referral to the Justice Department, which has the responsibility for criminal prosecutions.
Nevertheless, the EPA initiates investigations and develops the regulations upon which
many prosecutions are based. William Rodgers, Jr., 2 Environmental Law § 4.40 at 604
(West 1986 & Supp 1996); Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2460 (cited in note 8).
Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 842-43
(1984) (courts should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes).
W See note 6; Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2448-49 (cited in note 8).
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those restraints merely empty formalities without present-day

significance?
II. THE RULE OF LENITY
A. The Doctrine
The rule of lenity is a traditional canon of statutory construcetion in the criminal law calling on courts to construe ambiguous
penal statutes narrowly."' Although originally a device to lessen

the severity of punishment,37 the modern formulation of the rule
promotes several quasi-constitutional norms.

First, the rule protects due process rights by assuring that
potential defendants have fair notice of the law." The rule thus
disfavors vague or ambiguous statutes, as well as interpretations
that expand the scope of a criminal statute beyond its plain
meaning. The idea is that it is unfair to convict a defendant of a
crime without first giving her warning of the relevant legal rules
and her susceptibility to prosecution.39 The due process demand
for notice also rests on the need for predictability.' Individuals
should be able to anticipate what is illegal so they can conform
their behavior appropriately.
The rule of lenity also limits judicial discretion to supplement or create criminal law. By guaranteeing that legislatures
make the laws, the rule furthers separation of powers values.41
Judicial modesty recognizes the institutional competence of the
legislature in appropriately addressing problems too complex,
nuanced, or expansive for judicial resolution. The rule of lenity

1 United States v Wiltberger, 18 US 76, 95-96 (1820); United States v Bass, 404 US
336, 347-49 (1971); Norman Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03 at 102
(Clark Boardman Callaghan 5th ed 1992) ("Sutherland"); William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy
655-56 (West 2d ed 1995) ("Legislation");Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 197 (1994).
" Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 656 (cited in note 36). Despite being abardoned as the rationale for lenity, severity remains a relevant consideration in determining
when and how to apply the rule of lenity. See text accompanying notes 62-65, 69-76;
Singer, Sutherland § 59.03 at 103 (cited in note 36).
Singer, Sutherland § 59.03 at 103-4 (cited in note 36); Note, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev
at 202-13 (cited in note 36).
' This is not to say the rule of lenity forecloses the availability of discretionary standards. The rule of lenity is only concerned with ambiguity and its consequences, one of
which can be excessive discretion.
Dunn v United States, 442 US 100, 112 (1979); David Shapiro, Continuity and
Change in Statutory Interpretation,67 NYU L Rev 921, 943 (1992).
Singer, Sutherland § 59.03 at 104-5 (cited in note 36); Note, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev
at 202-12 (cited in note 36).
40
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also respects the singular importance of full and democratic deliberation in the creation of the criminal law.42
In addition to these quasi-constitutional justifications, the
rule of lenity offers several other pragmatic benefits. The rule
furthers good law-making by forcing the legislature to be specific
and clear. Consequently, legislatures cannot rely on the judiciary to resolve contentious or unexamined issues. If the legislature wants to criminalize an activity, it must do so itself. The
rule also assures consistent interpretation by preventing courts
faced with ambiguous statutes from rendering multiple, differing
interpretations." Because ambiguity serves as a grant of discretion to courts to fill in statutory gaps, and numerous jurisdictions
face the same statutes, differing interpretations are inevitable.4"
Both uniformity and consistency suffer.
By disfavoring ambiguity, the rule reduces opportunities for
selective and arbitrary enforcement.4 ' Ambiguity grants discretion to enforcement agencies, 47 opening the possibility for overzealous or biased prosecutorial decisionmaking." Furthermore,
restricting ambiguity helps the criminal law retain its deterrent
effect, 49 as well as its sanction and validity in the public eye.50
Deterrence is only possible when potential violators are aware of
what is prohibited. Moreover, ambiguity can make the enforcement of criminal environmental law seem arbitrary. Such a perception undermines that aspect of deterrence which relies on
public sanction by failing to convey the fairness expected of government action.

,2 United States v R.L.C., 503 US 291, 309 (1992) (Scalia concurring).
, Singer, Sutherland § 59.03 at 103-04 (cited in note 36); Note, 29 Harv CR-CL L
Rev at 209 (cited in note 36).
Note, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 209-10 (cited in note 36).
Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal CriminalLaw?, 110 Harv L Rev
469, 486 (1996).
" Singer, Sutherland § 59.03 at 104 (cited in note 36); Comment, Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Water Act Section 1319(c)(2)(A)'s Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling
the Needs of Environmentaland CriminalLaw, 23 Ecol L Q 447, 487-89 (1996).
,7 Kahan, 110 Harv L Rev at 479-81 (cited in note 45).
Id at 486-87.
,9 Issac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3
J Legal Stud 257, 264-67 (1974).
' Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integrationin the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Georgetown L J 2407, 2444
(1995). See also United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1293, 1299 (9th Cir 1993)
(Kleinfeld dissenting).
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B. Application to Criminal Environmental Law
Courts disagree on whether the rule of lenity should play a.
role in the interpretation of public welfare statutes.5 ' Parties
litigating the issue appeal to one of two lines of cases. Those
seeking to maintain the public welfare exception to the rule of
lenity for environmental crimes start with United States v International Minerals & Chemical Corp..52 In International Minerals, the Court refused to require knowledge of illegality for a.
conviction under Interstate Commerce Commission shipping
regulations. The Court held that defendants should be presumed.
to know of applicable regulations when they deal with "deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials,"' echoing
an earlier Court's similar admonition to those who stand in a.
"responsible relation to public danger. " '
Later rulings expanded on the InternationalMinerals analy-.
sis in the environmental crime context, largely concluding that it
would be inappropriate to construe public welfare statutes narrowly. In United States v Self, the Tenth Circuit found precedent
in favor of a narrow construction inapposite because "RCRA is a
public welfare statute which was designed 'to protect human
health and the environment.'"55 Courts typically interpret such
statutes broadly, in line with the remedial purpose doctrine..
According to the Third Circuit, "[C]riminal penalties attached to
regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast
to statutes based on common law crimes, are to be construed to
effectuate the regulatory purpose."" Most courts have adopted
this analysis and thereby avoid employing the rule of lenity irL
environmental crime cases. 7
Courts also disagree over the timing for application of the rule of lenity in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia suggests that the rule of lenity is an-important back.
ground principle in construing criminal laws and should be invoked any time statutory
ambiguity appears. The prevailing view, however, holds that a court should apply the rule
only as a last resort, after it exhausts all other tools of statutory interpretation, including
an inquiry into legislative intent. See United States v R.L.C., 503 US 291 (1992); Singer,
Sutherland § 59.04 at 118 (cited in note 36); Lisa Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule of
Lenity in the Interpretation of Environmental Crimes, 5 NYU Envir L J 600, 618-21
(1996).
52 402 US 558 (1971).
Id at 565.
United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277, 281 (1943).
2 F3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir 1993), quoting 42 USC § 6924(a) (1994).
6 United States v Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F2d 662, 666 (3d Cir 1984).
57 Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1283-86; United States v MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oi,
Co., 933 F2d 35, 49-50 (1st Cir 1991); United States v Baytank, 934 F2d 599, 613 (5th Cir
1991); United States v Hayes InternationalCorp., 786 F2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir 1986).
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On the other hand, those seeking to invoke the rule of lenity
can look to United States v Liparota" and Staples v United
States.59 Although not addressing environmental crimes, these
cases provide clarification on the proper interpretation of ambiguity in public welfare statutes. The Liparota Court strictly construed the knowledge requirement in a food stamp statute partly
based on rule of lenity concerns about statutes that "criminalize
a broad range of apparently innocent conduct.' ° Although this
decision broke with the traditional refusal to apply the rule to
public welfare offenses, the Court restricted the scope of its decision by distinguishing selling food stamps from activities people
know are subject to stringent regulation and may harm community health or safety.6
Recently, Staples v United States suggested that lenity may
also be appropriate for broadly sweeping, felony-level regulatory
crimes.' The Staples Court held that, in the face of congressional silence, the National Firearms Act required knowledge of the
characteristics of a firearm that brought it within the definition
of a machine gun and subjected an offender to a ten-year prison
sentence.' Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas traced the
history of the public welfare offense doctrine, citing numerous authorities for the proposition that crimes carrying stiff penalties
must have a criminal intent requirement because they cannot fall
within the public welfare offense exception." Thomas emphasized, "In rehearsing the characteristics of the public welfare offense, we, too, have included in our consideration the punishments imposed and have noted that 'penalties commonly are
relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an
offender's reputation."
Furthermore, the opinion echoed the Liparota Court's concern with criminalizing otherwise innocent behavior. "We are
reluctant to impute [a] purpose to Congress where, as here, it
would mean easing the path to convicting persons whose conduct
would not even alert them to the probability of strict regula-

471 US 419 (1985).
'9 511 US 600 (1994).
60 471 US at 426.
Id at 432-33.
62 511 US at 608-18.
60 Id at 619-20.
Id at 616-18.
65 Id at 617-18, quoting Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 256 (1952).
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tion ....

.

Fair notice thus is an essential element of criminal

enforcement.
Justice Thomas also responded to the claim that extensive!
regulation puts potential violators on notice, answering that;
"regulation in itself is not sufficient to place gun ownership in.
the category of [public welfare offenses]. 7 The government regulates many areas of life extensively, but as implicitly recognized.
in Liparota, which dealt with the overwhelmingly regulated area.
of food stamps, more is required. Likewise, the dangerousness of
an item or substance is not enough to put an individual on notice. "[T]hat an item is 'dangerous' in some general sense, does
not necessarily suggest... that it is not also entirely innocent.
Even dangerous items can in some cases, be so commonplace and
generally available that we would not consider them to alert
individuals to the likelihood of strict regulation.'
Staples thus reinterpreted the public welfare offense doctrine
with a realistic eye toward the expansiveness of regulation and.
the pervasiveness of dangerous items, substances, and activities.
Thomas shifted the doctrine's focus from the easily satisfied dan-gerousness and regulation standards toward a more dis..
criminating inquiry into a criminal provision's scope (the extent
to which it criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct) and severity
(the harshness of its penalties).
One possible implication, adopted by some judges, is that the
scope and severity of current criminal environmental provisions
call for courts to apply the rule of lenity and disregard the public
welfare offense doctrine."9 Foremost among the cases applying
the rule of lenity is United States v Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc., involving a dispute over whether a human being is a "point
source" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA). 7° In holding that
the CWA's ambiguity on the question required application of the
rule of lenity,71 the Second Circuit "view[ed] with skepticism the
government's contention that [it] should broadly construe the
greatly magnified penal provisions of the CWA based upon [Riv-

66
67

511 US at 615-16.
Id at 613.

Id at 611.
In addition to the cases discussed below, see United States v StandardOil Co., 384
US 224, 230-37 (1966) (Harlan dissenting).
70 3 F3d 643 (2d Cir 1993).
71 Id at 647-49.
6
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ers and Harbors Act] cases that did so in the context of strictliability and misdemeanor penalties."7 2
The First Circuit has also applied the rule of lenity to environmental criminal statues. In United States v Borowski, the
government attempted to use the CWA to prosecute an employer
for exposing his employees to dangerous substances at a point of
discharge. The First Circuit ruled that such an expansive interpretation of ambiguous provisions relating to who is protected
by the CWA would violate the rule of lenity.74
The most analytically robust defense of the rule of lenity's
applicability to environmental crime comes from five judges on
the Ninth Circuit in a dissent from a rejection of a petition for
rehearing en banc.7" Despite the fact that judges rarely grant a
petition for rehearing, even when they believe a decision to be
wrong, 76 a significant portion of the Ninth Circuit wanted to
rehear a case involving a prosecution under the CWA for exceeding a discharge permit. The dissenters, relying largely on
Staples, argued that a felony prosecution for transgressing a
permit limit both imposes stiff penalties and criminalizes innocent conduct such that the rule of lenity should invalidate a conviction based on an ambiguous knowledge standard.7 7 Likewise,
in distinguishing InternationalMinerals, the dissenters found it
particularly persuasive that the CWA is not limited to
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste
materials" and that this case involved a felony rather than a
misdemeanor.78
It is clear that ample judicial disagreement exists over what
role the rule of lenity should play in the interpretation of criminal environmental provisions. Principled resolution requires
determining whether the justifications for the rule of lenity resonate in the environmental context.

72

Id at 648.

7 977 F2d 27 (1st Cir 1992).
7' Id at 31-32.
7' United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1293-99 (9th Cir 1993) (Kleinfeld dissenting).
76 Id at 1293.
7 Id at 1296.97.
7' Id at 1298.
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III. SHOULD THE RULE OF LENITY APPLY TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIME?
A. The Case for Applying the Rule of Lenity
1. Characteristicsof environmental law.
The rule of lenity should be applied to criminal provisions in
environmental statutes. The increased severity and scope of criminal liability in the nation's environmental law make the analogy
between environmental and criminal law persuasive. Penalties
and prosecutions under criminal environmental provisions resemble those traditionally associated with criminal law.7" Criminal
enforcement usually involves felony prosecution and is available
for most regulatory violations. Thus, application of the rule of
lenity to environmental crime follows recent Supreme Court jurisprudence denying that dangerousness or regulation are the
hallmarks of a public welfare offense, and asserting instead that
severity and scope distinguish offenses subject to traditional
criminal protections. 0
Furthermore, many regulatory violations that give rise to
criminal liability involve otherwise innocent conduct."1 Most violations of environmental law involve exceeding permit limits,82
disposing of innocuous materials," or altering or improving
one's property."4 In criminal law, such acts are mala prohibita,
wrong merely because they are prohibited, as opposed to mala in
se, inherently wrong." Traditionally, mala prohibita crimes had
stricter standards of liability than mala in se crimes"8 and "particularly required" application of the rule of lenity, 7 because
7' See text accompanying notes 5-20.
8 See text accompanying notes 58-68.
8' Kathleen Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of
Environmental and CriminalLaw Theory 3 (Washington University School of Law Working Paper No 96-4-1, 1996) ("Crossroads");United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1296
(9th Cir 1993) (IWeinfeld dissenting).
82 See, for example, United States v Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d 1275, 1281-82 (9th Cir 1993).
See, for example, United States v Pozsgai, 757 F Supp 21, 21-22 (E D Pa 1991).
See, for example, United States v Mills, 817 F Supp 1546, 1548-49 (N D Fla 1993).
Whether or in what proportion environmental crimes are mala prohibits is open to
debate. However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of the current Comment. Therefore, I will accept the traditional distinction that characterizes most environmental law
violations as mala prohibita because such acts were 'not crimes at common law, any
human injuries are typically diffuse and attenuated, and traditional standards of morality
are not implicated. See Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, CriminalLaw § 1.6 at 23
(West 2d ed 1986).
' Joshua Dressler, UnderstandingCriminalLaw § 11.02[B], [C] at 126-27 (Matthew
Bender/Irwin 2d ed 1995) ("Understanding").
87 Norman Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.04 at 118-19 (Clark
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people could not be presumed to know their conduct was illegal.
Similarly, potentially liable parties need adequate notice of provisions in environmental statutes that carry criminal penalties
because such statutes often criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.88
In addition, environmental statutes are notoriously ambigu89
ous. Congressional deal-making and sloppy statute writing
have rendered portions of America's environmental law largely
unintelligible. 0 Furthermore, EPA regulation often fails to adequately clarify the statutory framework. In fact, poorly drafted or
inconsistent EPA regulations occasionally introduce significant
uncertainty.9 ' Moreover, the multiple sources of interpretation
in a criminal/administrative bureaucracy, ranging from the local
prosecutor to formal federal rulemaking, exacerbate regulatory
confusion.92 The well-documented and pervasive role of interest
group politics in environmental statute writing and rulemaking
pulls the process in multiple and often conflicting directions,
adding further ambiguity.9 3 Under such circumstances, statutory
interpretation becomes a Herculean task for a judge, much less a
private citizen. It runs contrary to basic notions of fairness to invoke serious criminal sanctions in the face of such ambiguity.
Other characteristics of environmental law exacerbate interpretive difficulties. Environmental law is aspirational." It often
codifies collective desires for a particular state of environmental
Boardman Callaghan 5th ed 1992) ("Sutherland").
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 S Ct Rev 345, 400
(1995).
Brickey, Crossroads at 14 (cited in note 81); Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental
Criminal Law, 83 Georgetown L J 2407, 2431 (1995).
o Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2431-36 (cited in note 89). See, for example, Comment, CERCLA's Petroleum Exclusion: Bad Policy in a Problematic Statute, 27 Loyola LA
L Rev 1157 (1994).
" Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2437-38 (cited in note 89) (describing United States
v Self, 2 F3d 1071 (10th Cir 1993), where the court had to parse four conflicting regulatory preambles).
2 Daniel L. Karls, Regulatory Confusion Defense in Clean Water Act Section 404 Enforcement, 1 Envir Law 827, 844, 858 (1995).
The dirty coal provisions of the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments and the ethanol
provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments evidence the role of special interests in
environmental law. Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler, Clean Coal/DirtyAir: Or How
the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-DollarBail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers
and What Should Be Done About It (Yale 1981) (1977 Clean Air Act); Gary Bryner, Blue
Skies, Green Politics: The Clean Air Act of 1990 and Its Implementation 1-50, 96-140, 16873, 199-204, 211-19 (CQ 2d ed 1995) (1990 Clean Air Act).
11 Brickey, Crossroads at 11-13 (cited in note 81); Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at
2424-26 (cited in note 89).
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quality with little or no reference to the harsh consequences such
standards necessitate. Ultimately, this dissonance results in
either unattainable standards, intentional underenforcement, or
both.95 A statutory scheme divorced from reality and an enforcement strategy that consciously disregards the statutory scheme
both pose significant interpretive problems.
Likewise, environmental law's dynamic nature complicates
the interpretive task." The politicization of environmental law
keeps it subject to constantly changing political and social forces
not typically encountered with traditional criminal law. Powerful
interest groups on both sides of every debate constantly raise
new issues and exert formidable pressure on lawmakers.97 Additionally, the law's scientific basis places it at the mercy of tentative principles, shifting consensus, and new discoveries." Interpreting statutes that are in a "constant state of flux" is bound to
be difficult and is antithetical to the demands of certainty and
predictability in the criminal law.
Environmental law is also considerably complex.9 9 Highly
specialized technical language pervades the relevant statutes and
regulations. When only the most learned experts can make sense
of statutory provisions, the burden on judges, not to mention
potential violators, to make perfectly accurate judgments may be
too great.
Finally, environmental law is obscure."° Many important
provisions are buried in mountains of regulations. Furthermore,
many requirements are published in memos, preambles, and
other informal publications, a practice that subverts the notice
and comment process and creates an "underground environmental law." 1 ' Interpreting such a morass of overlapping and occasionally conflicting statutes, regulations, and policy statements
asks too much in the criminal context.

Lazarus, 83 Geo L J at 2424-26 (cited in note 89); Cass Sunstein, After the Rights

Revolution 91-92 (Harvard 1990).
Brickey, Crossroadsat 13 (cited in note 81).
See note 93.

Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2427 (cited in note 89).
,9 Joel Epstein and Theodore Hammett, Law Enforcement Response to Environmental
Crime 13-14 (National Institute of Justice 1995); Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2428-36
(cited in note 89).
"7
Kevin Gaynor, A System Spinning Out of Control, Envir F 28-29 (May-June 1990);
Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2436-39 (cited in note 89) ("EPA regulations are merely
the most formal and visible peaks in a vast range of underground and fragmented agency
guidance on the meaning of relevant federal statutory and regulatory provisions.").
...Brickey, Crossroads at 15 (cited in note 81).
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2. Rule of lenity concerns.
All of the generally applicable rationales behind the rule of
lenity apply with at least equal force to criminal environmental
law. It is fundamentally unfair to convict someone without first
assuring that they have adequate notice of the law's demands.0 2 As indicated above, the environmental law's pervasive ambiguity and criminalization of otherwise innocent conduct
only serve to emphasize the need for fairness."' Additionally,
judicial interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes undermines the traditionally high standards of democratic legitimacy
expected of laws carrying criminal sanctions." This point applies with extra force to environmental law, where the law's
complexity challenges judicial competence to resolve statutory
ambiguity and the law's broad scope demands clear political ratification.1 5
Furthermore, allowing ambiguity to pervade criminal environmental law diminishes the validity and sanction of those laws
in the public eye."° Considering the twenty-year struggle to elevate environmental degradation to a serious legal and ethical
transgression worthy of public condemnation, 1 7 any backsliding
would be particularly harmful. Deterrence also suffers from ambiguity. When even conscientious parties have difficulty ascertaining what the law requires of them, parties will both over and
under comply."° In addition, application of the rule of lenity
will help reduce the notorious ambiguity in environmental law by
requiring Congress and administrative agencies to develop clear
and specific laws or regulations. 9
Restricting judicial interpretation of ambiguity also helps
assure consistent interpretation,"0 a result of particular importance to the nationwide actors often targeted for prosecution in

102

See text accompanying notes 38-40.

" See text accompanying notes 89-93 (ambiguity) and text accompanying notes 81-88
(otherwise innocent conduct).
104

See text accompanying notes 41-42.

1o" See text accompanying note 99.
1 6 See text accompanying note 50.

"07 Gerhard O.W. Mueller, An Essay on Environmental Criminality, in Sally M.
Edwards, Terry D. Edwards, and Charles B. Fields, eds, Environmental Crime and
Criminality: Theoretical and Practical Issues 8 (Garland 1996) ("Criminality"); Susan
Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 Geo

Wash L Rev 889, 889-93 (1991).

'10 See text accompanying note 49.

'09 See text accompanying notes 89-93 (ambiguity) and text accompanying note 43
(clear and specific laws).
"0 See text accompanying note 44.
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criminal environmental law. Finally, ambiguity permits selective
and arbitrary enforcement.'
In the environmental realm,
where enforcement is committed to agencies accustomed to administering civil provisions with nearly unfettered discretion,"'
protection from overzealous, unpredictable, and politically motivated prosecutions is necessary."' Likewise, the dearth of government officials with expertise in both environmental and criminal law exacerbates the incoherence of prosecutorial decisionmaking.114

B. Possible Objections
Critics can raise three objections to the contention that the
rule of lenity should apply to environmental crime. The first
counterargument rests on precedent. The Supreme Court has
never explicitly applied the rule of lenity to environmental crime
and only a few other courts have done so."' Furthermore, regardless of severity or scope, environmental laws are the
prototypical public welfare statutes and numerous cases hold as
much."
Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent on criminal statutory interpretation suggests that, given the proper case, the Court
would apply the rule of lenity in the environmental crime
realm." 7 The reasoning of the Liparota-Staples line of cases is
particularly persuasive with respect to criminal environmental
law. Penalties are increasingly severe and criminal provisions
reach more and more innocent behavior. Furthermore, despite
the fact that traditional environmental crimes are the
prototypical public welfare offenses, changed circumstances make
blind application of the public welfare exception anachronistic.
The original regulatory crimes examined by the Court were narrowly defined misdemeanors, not broadly cast felonies."'

. See text accompanying notes 46-48.
...Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2460 (cited in note 89) (describing EPA autonomy
over administrative remedies and significant control over civil remedies).
..
3 Brickey, Crossroads at 4 (cited in note 81); Donald Carr, et al, Environmental
Criminal Liability: Avoiding and Defending Enforcement Actions 114-15 (BNA 1995)
("Liability"); Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2459-66 (cited in note 89).
11 Lazarus, 83 Geo L J at 2462 (cited in note 89).
"'

11
17
11

See text accompanying notes 52-57.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 58-68.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F3d at 1296-99; Staples v United States, 511 US 600, 608-18 (1994);

Lazarus, 83 Georgetown L J at 2480 (cited in note 89). See, for example, Morissette v
United States, 342 US 246 (1952).
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A second objection argues that the rule of lenity stands in
the way of effective and aggressive enforcement of environmental
laws.' On this view, application of the rule of lenity would
eliminate administrative and judicial flexibility needed to deal
with loopholes and other problems not adequately addressed by
the statute, in the name of criminals who destroy the environment, perhaps irreparably. Giving such people the benefit of the
doubt fails to appreciate the seriousness of environmental degradation.
This objection suffers from an unrealistic, binary view of
available strategies. Application of the rule of lenity does not
open the flood gates and leave the environment unprotected. To
the contrary, the government retains significant civil and administrative enforcement powers,"2 not to mention the availability
of citizen suits 2 and private causes of action. In addition, the
rule of lenity does not foreclose criminal enforcement. It only
requires Congress and administrative agencies to write less ambiguous laws and regulations. In fact, application of the rule of
lenity will have no effect on the many clear and specific laws and
regulations. Even when it does have an effect, the rule may only
require more from the government in the way of proof, such as in
the scienter cases." Finally, although threats to the environment demand great vigilance, threats to long-standing liberties
deserve at least equal vigilance.
Third, one could assert that the rule of lenity's demand for
unambiguous statutes is impractical and too costly."2 Eliminating ambiguity is often impossible, especially ex ante. Issues may
be too contentious or unforeseeable. Furthermore, remedying ambiguity is costly in terms of the resources that must be devoted to
finding and clarifying ambiguous text and mediating policy disKahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 406-12 (cited in note 88).
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6928(c), (g) (1994) (violation of
compliance order, civil penalties); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC § 9609 (civil awards and penalties) (1994); Clean Water
Act, 33 USC § 1319(b), (d) (1994) (civil action, civil penalties); Clean Air Act, 42 USC
§ 7413(b), (d) (1994) (civil judicial, civil administrative). But see Crandon v United States,
494 US 152 (1990) (holding that the rule of lenity applies to provisions carrying civil
penalties where the standard of conduct is found in a criminal statute).
1 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC § 6972 (1994); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC § 9659 (1994); Clean
Water Act, 33 USC § 1365 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7604 (1994). But see Lujan v
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-62 (1992) (casting doubt on the viability of citizen
suits).
1
Staples, 511 US at 616 n 11. See note 26.
123 Kahan, 1994 S Ct Rev at 407-15 (cited in note 88).
1,

120
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agreements. Additionally, striking down ambiguous criminal
provisions while raising the cost of replacing them would leave
significant gaps in an enforcement scheme.
In response to this argument, it must first be asked, what it
means for good lawmaking to be too costly or impractical. Such
statements typically mean that. society is not sufficiently concerned with the downside of easier and cheaper lawmaking. Perhaps the potential harm to the environment justifies cheaper
lawmaking, but should traditional criminal law standards be
discarded without considering the rights of those within the
broad scope of criminal environmental law? Furthermore, shifting
lawmaking responsibility to administrative agencies is entirely
consistent with lenity, provided agencies understand their grant
of discretion to be administrative (implementing and enforcing
congressional judgments), rather than legislative (making their
own judgments).12 Finally, an accounting of the costs of good
lawmaking must consider the costs of adjudication. In addition to
the obvious cost to the government and private parties in constantly litigating ambiguity, the costs of uncertainty, error, overdeterrence, and private interpretation are important."
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the government has increasingly employed
criminal sanctions to enforce environmental laws. As a result,
current criminal environmental law is of unprecedented scope
and severity. In light of the considerable ambiguity characteristic
of environmental law, courts, lawmakers, and citizens should be
particularly attentive to the law's increased harshness and
breadth. Concerns should only be sharpened by environmental
law's obscure, complex, aspirational, and dynamic nature, its
reliance on administrative agency definition and implementation,
and its tendency to criminalize otherwise innocent behavior.
For courts, the traditional rule of lenity, requiring ambiguous
penal statutes to be construed narrowly, provides a set of principles that ensure the fairness and legitimacy of these laws. Fur' Thus, adoption of the rule of lenity does not require rejection of the Chevron principle. In fact, lenity and Chevron share a fundamental distaste for the pathologies of judicial lawmaking. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 111)
Harv L Rev 469, 509-11 (1996). Contrast Lisa Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule ef
Lenity in the Interpretation of Environmental Crimes, 5 NYU Envir L J 600, 625-36
(1996).
,25 Kahan, 110 Harv L Rev at 485 (cited in note 124); Issac Ehrlich and Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257, 262-67 (1974).
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thermore, restricting ambiguity increases the effectiveness of
deterrence, encourages the development of clear and specific
standards, furthers consistent interpretation, and restricts opportunities for selective or arbitrary enforcement. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that courts have not commonly applied the rule
to public welfare offenses, the current state of criminal environmental law demands application of the rule of lenity.

